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"The origins
of the Cuban missile crisis, which many
historians consider to be the point at which the
Cold War came nearest to open conflict, and which
was, without any doubt, an event of world-wide
importance, are paradoxically to be found in
regional Latin American politics.
In the beginning, the developments in Cuba
followed roughly speaking a pattern already known
from other countries in the region. A leftist
(but not communist) guerrilla movement was
organized against the island's dictator
(Batista), setting as its aims: more social
equality among the country's citizens and
relative independence from the United States; a
movement playing, as so often, on the peoples
hatred of the gringos and of big proprietors (the
two often coinciding). What was different from
other cases, was Castro's unexpected success and
the inability of the United States to respond to
it, mainly because they had not backed Batista in
the last years of hid regime and as a result had
not any group on which Castro's overthrow could
be based (contrary to Guatemala, where they had
been able to count on the military's support).
The Bay of Pigs proved that this group could not
be Cuban emigrants.
Only gradually, as Cuba was being sanctioned and
was threatened by isolation, did this regional
conflict become part of the Cold War. It is
important to notice that it was rather Castro who
had the idea of making his revolution part of the
East-West conflict -(he asked the communist
states to sell him arms)- than Khrushchev seizing
an opportunity to challenge the United States in
the Western Hemisphere. Initially, the Soviet
Union did not seriously consider intervening on a
larger scale in what was generally recognized,
since the formulation of the Monroe doctrine, as
an exclusively American sphere of influence.
At the stage when the USSR promised economic and
then military aid to Cuba, we can first speak of
the broader causes of the missile crisis. If
Khrushchev took the risk of placing nuclear
weapons in Cuba, it was because it would give him
enormous advantages (or reduce the existing
disadvantages) over the United States. Since the
Soviets were only starting to develop ICBM's,
they could hope to attack the continental United
States only by placing medium-range rockets in a
place like Cuba. The Americans had the
geographical advantage of being able to deploy
their missiles in Europe or in Turkey and the
technical advantage of possessing more ICBM's. A
success in Cuba, moreover, could enable
Khrushchev to impose solutions in other urgent
issues, such as the recognition of a divided
Germany and the withdrawal of Allied forces from
West Berlin. As in other cases (like the threat
of handing over the whole of Berlin to the East
German administration or boasting his nonexistent
military superiority) the Cuban affair was in
great part a bluff, conceived to force out
concessions from the new president whom
Khrushchev considered to be weak. Thus, in
retrospect, we should not be surprised that he
backed down soon after Kennedy's ultimatum.
The impact of the crisis was, contrary to its
origins, global and affected countries which had
not taken part in it. On the regional level, it
affirmed the sovereignty of the new Cuban
government and enabled Castro to survive. Cuba
would be from now on independent from the United
States, but the crisis made it irrevocably bound
to the Soviet bloc, both in economic and
ideological terms, the more so as member states
of the OAS (except Mexico) were made to break up
relations with Cuba.
Cuba's case was to be an example for other
countries in the region, proving that it was
possible to oppose the US hegemony in Latin
America. the Caribbean island was to become a
base for other revolutionary anti-American
movements, which Castro and Che Guevara set out
to support actively, while the Soviet Union had
moderate belief in the possibility of competing
with the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
Later on, the Cuban military could be used in
countries like Angola where the Soviets preferred
not to intervene directly.
For the United States, the crisis was a clear
message that they should have more decisive
policies in their "backyard" and consequently
worsened their relations with Latin American
States. In the future they would be more
repressive, and fearing another Cuba, would
sometimes overreact, like in the case of the
Dominican Republic after the assassination of the
dictator Trujillo. Kennedy's management of the
crisis brought him some new popularity, which he,
however, would not enjoy for a long time. In
fact, there were many US politicians who thought
he had not been harsh enough with the Russians,
and this discontentment among the political
establishment might well have been one of the
reasons for his death.
(Marginal comment here shows the teacher
complaining about the influence of Oliver Stone)
The fact that Kennedy did not consult with his
West European allies when dealing with the crisis
was another sign that the power of Great Britain
and France was fading. For de Gaulle it was
another reason to distrust the Anglo-Saxons and
made him finally withdraw French forces from NATO
and set into practice his plans for a French
"Force de Frappe".
At last, the crisis "frightened" both superpowers
and made them realize that a local conflict and a
few miscalculations on either side could possibly
bring about the prospect of another world war. As
a result, a "hot line" between Moscow and
Washington was established to allow consultation
on urgent matters and a treaty on nuclear weapon
signed, placing a ban on nuclear tests in the
atmosphere and underwater. The only two counties
who possessed atom bombs and who could afford not
to sign were France who, as we mentioned took a
more independent course after the crisis, and
China who by that time had placed itself outside
the direct East-West confrontation because of
worsening relations with the Soviet Union. As to
the impact on ordinary citizens, the Cuban
missile crisis must have broadened the awareness
of the atomic threat and of the stalemate in
which a war could not any more result in the
victory of either side, but would bring about
mutual destruction." |
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